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Introduction  
 
 The Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues 
(PCSBI) recently introduced and reaffirmed “[t]he principle of democratic 
deliberation” (2010; 2012) while noting that it is “a less familiar principle in 
bioethics than the principles of beneficence and justice” (2010, 30). No 
other prominent set of bioethical principles lists a similar principle (Veatch 
2007). Though new to bioethics, democratic deliberation has been 
employed elsewhere in practical ethics (Gutmann & Thompson 2004, 18-
19, 31, 33). 
 This chapter explains democratic deliberation and considers its 
implications for ethical review of human subjects research. It argues that 
democratic deliberation favors the inclusion of research participants’ 
perspectives in ethical review, as well as the ethical review of “public 
benefits” research.  
 
I. Democratic Deliberation Explained 
 
 Democratic deliberation involves a public exchange of ideas within 
and across groups of ordinary citizens, experts, and political representatives. 
Participants should aim to engage actively with one another, and to offer 
reasons that are acceptable and intelligible to their interlocutors. Decisions 
should be revisable as new information and new perspectives come into 
view (PCSBI 2010). 
 The PCSBI emphasized the deliberative character of its own 
procedures, in particular when engaging with religious and moral concerns 
about the synthetic biology innovations it was then evaluating (2010, 139). 
These examples of public involvement far exceed the current requirement in 
human subjects research that an Institutional Review Board include a 
nonscientific and a lay member (Fost & Levine 2007).  
 Incorporating democratic deliberation into decisionmaking can 
render the resulting decisions both more respectful and more accurate. First, 
by involving all parties in the decisionmaking process, democratic 
deliberation can ensure that the process’s outcomes, whatever they are, 
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express participants’ values. Amy Gutmann, the PCSBI’s current chair, has 
argued that even when some lose out in democrative deliberation, the 
outcome is not imposed on them, but instead results from something they 
authorized (Gutmann & Thompson 2004, 21-23). Such authorization can 
differentiate a just from an unjust outcome, even when the content of the 
two outcomes is identical.  
 Other legal and political contexts feature democratic deliberation. 
For example, recent innovations in restorative justice emphasize 
deliberative engagement between criminals and victims, which makes it 
possible for both to see the legal resolution as just (Parkinson & Roche 
2004, 510). Within the civil law, deliberative engagement helps ensure that 
contentious processes—such as divorce proceedings and family disputes—
respect both prevailing and defeated participants (Menkel-Meadow 2004, 
361). 
 Deliberation can enhance accuracy as well as respectfulness. Each 
participant in deliberation brings a distinctive positional perspective; an 
ordinary citizen may have less technical knowledge than an expert but more 
knowledge about how people are employing technology (Anderson 2003, 
57). A well-structured deliberative body can, ideally, know more than even 
its most knowledgeable individuals, rather than simply knowing as much as 
its average participant (Gutmann & Thompson 2004, 12). 
 
II. Participatory Inclusion: Involving Research Participants in Ethical 
Review 
 
 As we consider how to revise existing human subjects research 
regulations, consider that a revised Common Rule might incorporate 
democratic deliberation by drawing on the experience of research 
participants themselves when reviewing human subjects research proposals. 
The current regime charges IRBs with protecting research participants, but  
assigns no member the task of representing research participants. While 
IRBs must “safeguard[] the rights and welfare of human subjects,” they are 
neither required to engage deliberatively with research participants nor to 
provide a voice for participants in the ethical review process. The lay 
member on the IRB is not required to learn about, or advocate for, research 
participants’ concerns.  
 In contrast, professional ethics and policy review boards outside 
research ethics frequently represent the clients, governments, and 
professionals they regulate or protect (Porter 1987). These boards exemplify 
the participatory inclusion of laypeople (Johnson 2009; Agarwal 2008). 
Numerous legal provisions ensure the participatory inclusion of clients on 
committees that regulate clinical research and medical care, as the following 
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table indicates. 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
 
A. Participatory inclusion as democratic deliberation 
 
 How do participatory inclusion statutes advance democratic 
deliberation? Review boards that are not directly democratic (say, the 
National Park Service’s board of directors) often are thought of as 
democratic because a democratically elected official (the President) 
appoints an officer (the Secretary of the Interior) who in turn appoints the 
board. In contrast, participatory inclusion aims at more direct legitimacy, by 
mandating that the board reflect the perspectives of a variety of interests.  
 Does having a representative group member on an advisory board 
suffice to drive that group toward democratic deliberation? I’ll consider 
three potential objections: (1) that representing research participants on 
boards doesn’t help protect them and can even hurt their interests; (2) that 
research participants’ interests are best served by a notice-and-comment or 
survey process rather than a representative member on a board; and (3) 
democratic deliberation should have no special solicitude for research 
participants.  
 
1. Does participatory inclusion protect participants? 
 
 Rand Rosenblatt worries that a participant representative on an 
advisory board might provide a veneer of approval without substantively 
influencing the board’s decisions (Rosenblatt 1978). Concerns that 
procedural protections such as rights of voice and representation are inferior 
to substantive protections have arisen elsewhere in criminal and civil law 
(Cassell 2011; MacCoun 2005), and in the development of community 
advisory boards for clinical research (Recommendations 2009). This 
concern would counsel against representing participants on boards and in 
favor of instead writing strong participant protections into research 
regulations. Such a suggestion would parallel the more general argument 
that an advisory committee can deliberate effectively regardless of its 
composition, and that considering a committee’s output is enough to assess 
its deliberation (Walters 2012, 681). But for deliberation to be effective, 
participants in deliberation must “represent a personal, educational, and 
cultural variety of life experiences” (Estlund 1997, 191)—a requirement 
that advisory committees without any review of membership are not 
guaranteed to satisfy.  
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 Despite his initial worries, Rosenblatt concludes that involving 
participants in a process can both produce empowering outcomes and itself 
be empowering: 
 
[I]t is important to remember that the value of consumer 
participation and agency explanation does not lie solely in the 
opportunity to secure a different outcome. What Professor Tribe has 
termed “the right to be heard from, and the right to be told why . . . 
express the elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, 
is at least to be consulted about what is done with one.” Expressed 
in political terms, this root concept of human dignity highlights the 
need for a reconstruction of the democratic process, in which 
consultation over fundamental human needs is not made 
meaningless by a labyrinthine bureaucracy. By offering unorganized 
interests the right to participate in programs for their own benefit, 
the traditions of structural due process also help to encourage its 
exercise and thereby help to strengthen democratic capacity (264, 
1978). 
 
In the Medicaid context, Rosenblatt therefore endorses “medical care 
advisory committees,” which “include Medicaid recipients and other 
consumers (as well as providers) in the policymaking process” by giving 
them “adequate opportunity for meaningful participation in policy 
development and program administration” (264, 1978).  
 
2. Survey representation versus personal representation 
 
 A different way of including, rather than just protecting, participants 
would be a notice-and-comment process analogous to the requirement that 
administrative agencies solicit and respond to public comments when they 
engage in rulemaking (Cuellar 2005, 421). For instance, ethics review 
committees might be required to survey research participants and consider 
the results when deciding whether to renew or approve protocols.  
 The choice between participatory inclusion and surveys raises some 
of the same issues that arise in choices between representative and direct 
democratic approaches, with the caveat that the representative here is not 
elected, but rather selected by discretionary choice from a group. As such, a 
better analogy than the choice between representative democracy and direct 
democracy might be the choice between direct democracy (participatory 
inclusion) and a citizens’ jury (surveys). Citizens’ juries attempt to achieve 
what Hanna Pitkin calls descriptive representation, which ensures that the 
representative is relevantly similar to her constituency (80, 1967).  
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 Survey approaches may lack sufficient voice in a representative 
system. To see why, imagine that, instead of adding new Senators when 
admitting a new state, new states were instead represented in the Senate 
through surveys: whenever a bill is proposed in the Senate, new states 
would be surveyed and the existing Senators would be required to attend to 
the survey results. The new states might complain that (1) Senators will not 
be held accountable for attending to the survey results, and (2) minor 
decisionmaking will either require a surfeit of referenda or exclude those 
represented by surveys. Similarly, a survey of research participants might 
not be taken seriously by a review board and would be unable to anticipate 
specific issues that arise in ethical review. In contrast, a participant 
representative would be on equal footing with other board members and 
well-placed to investigate and deliberate about major and minor issues as 
they arise. Finally, participatory inclusion approaches do not rule out the 
use of surveys: the representative, for instance, could survey other 
participants as part of her review process. 
 
3. Why represent research participants at all? 
 
 What is the normative argument for setting aside special seats for 
participants? After all, IRB-reviewed research is supported by tax revenue, 
and benefits many individuals in society who do not participate in research, 
yet there is no movement to represent these beneficiaries on IRBs. 
 The prevalence of participatory inclusion requirements on boards 
analogous to ethics review bodies offers some reason to think setting aside 
seats for participants is justified. But a more theoretically developed 
account can be found in discussions of consociational democracy. Andreas 
Føllesdal describes a consociational system as follows: 
 
[C]onsociational democracy . . . . is a non-territorial form of 
federalism, characterized by cooperation among elites of 
different segments of a society, often split along religious or 
ethnic lines. It entails government by grand coalitions, 
granting autonomy to groups with veto rights over matters 
important to them (202, 1998). 
 
Like consociationalism, participant representation constitutes “non-
territorial federalism”: research participants should be represented in 
decisions that affect them, even if we do not grant them “veto rights” as the 
consocialist might (Cuellar 2005, 417). Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers have 
similarly suggested that we open up more arenas in democracies for 
decisionmaking by bodies of representatives of particular interest groups 
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(1992). 
  
B. Participatory Inclusion in the Human Subjects Research Context 
 
 Many participatory inclusion provisions include clients. Others 
include people whom institutions evaluate or regulate. Participants are both 
objects of evaluation and clients: as such, participatory inclusion seems no 
less appropriate in a research context than in either of the two it melds. 
 How might research participants’ perspectives be better integrated 
into the ethics review process via participatory inclusion? Laurie Flynn and 
Ronald Honberg suggest that IRBs reviewing mental health research should 
“require the inclusion of individuals who have personally experienced 
severe mental illnesses as consumers or family members,” because 
“consumers and family members, by virtue of their personal experiences, 
are more likely to focus on those aspects of research designs which may 
impact (positively or negatively) on the well-being of vulnerable research 
subjects” (188, 1998). Flynn and Honberg, however, mandate the inclusion 
of patients, rather than research subjects. The two are different  
 Additional regulations on IRB composition along the lines Flynn 
and Honberg suggest, however, may exacerbate concerns that IRBs are 
overbureaucratized (Fost & Levine 2007, 2196). Regulations on 
composition that prevent IRBs from achieving a quorum could produce 
“substitution effects,” such as pressures to strip jurisdiction from IRBs, that 
undermine their direct effects.  
 Concerns about overbureaucratization might counsel permitting and 
encouraging, but not requiring, that research participants be represented in 
ethical review. This parallels the approach ultimately taken in staffing the 
boards of the PPACA’s health insurance “exchanges.” Public comment 
suggested that board members should have various specific forms of 
expertise and background. HHS responded by requiring that “at least one 
member of the Exchange's board must include one voting member who is a 
consumer representative,” but stopped short of mandating more specific 
expertise.  
 Representation by advocates rather than fellow participants is also 
possible, and might help alleviate overbureaucratization concerns by 
widening the pool of potential representatives or allowing current 
nonscientific IRB members to serve as advocates. Some nonscientific or 
unaffiliated members required by current IRB regulations see their roles as 
including “[r]epresenting . . . human subjects' interests”; “[r]eviewing the 
research from the point of view of a potential subject”; “[a]cting as the ally 
or the peer of the research subject,” and “[a]cting as a patient advocate and 
surrogate subject” (Porter 1997, 2 tbl. 1). Nonvoting observers or advisors 
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who explicitly represent research participants’ perspectives might augment 
the phenomenon Porter identifies: Sirotin et al. suggest that “[p]rofessionals 
who work extensively with prospective research populations could help 
articulate those perspectives and should be encouraged to formally explore 
those perspectives, perhaps through focus groups and interviews,” and that 
“IRBs might also work with research subject advocates, who work closely 
with research participants and seek to represent their perspectives” (2010, 
15). Advocates may have expertise that makes them better able to protect 
participants’ interests, may not be vulnerable to conflicts of interest, or may 
have broader expertise in the conduct of research than individual 
participants might. These arguments might be counterbalanced, however, by 
the advantages of descriptive representation (Minow 1991, 278-79). 
 Those revising research ethics regulations should consider more 
explicitly including research participants’ perspectives in review. 45 C.F.R. 
§46.107(f), which provides that the IRB may “invite individuals with 
competence in special areas to assist in the review of issues which require 
expertise beyond or in addition to that available on the IRB,” may already 
allow the inclusion of participants. The current wording frames the invitees 
as technical experts, which might seem to exclude participants. But this 
provision might be understood, or even reworded, to recognize the 
experiential expertise of research participants—a form of special knowledge 
that they acquire through experiencing a medical condition and participating 
in the research enterprise from the participant perspective (Bal, Bijker, and 
Hendriks 2004, 1340), just as it has been understood to include expert 
bioethicists (DeRenzo & Wichman 1990, 6). While the current provisions 
make the expert members nonvoting members, the rules could be revised to 
grant research participant members a voice as voters.  
Meanwhile, although 45 C.F.R. §46.111(b) directs the IRB to 
specially scrutinize the substance of research on vulnerable subjects, it 
could also justify modifying the review procedure, and thus present an 
avenue for participant inclusion. Where research proposes to involve 
vulnerable populations, protecting their interests may counsel 
democratically including them or their representatives in the deliberations 
leading up to research approval. The numerous participatory inclusion 
requirements in statutes regulating mental health, elder care, and disability 
issues outside of research lend support to such an approach. Indeed, IRBs 
reviewing research on prisoners already are required to include a “prisoner 
or prisoner representative under 45 CFR §46.304. 
 
III. The Need for Ethical Review of Public Benefits Research 
 
 Democratic deliberation also has implications for the exemption of 
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public benefits research—experimental research on the efficacy of programs 
like Medicare and Medicaid—from IRB review under 45 C.F.R. 
§46.101(b)(5). The ANPRM suggests expanding the exemption. But 
deliberative democratic concerns counsel against such expansions. Public 
benefit research has the potential to force beneficiaries of public programs 
like Medicaid—who are often socially and economically vulnerable—into 
research whose intended aims may be contrary to participants’ interests. In 
contrast, ethical review of public benefits research requires those attempting 
to revise public benefit programs to get the consent of current beneficiaries, 
which requires that they explain the proposed changes and provide an 
account of why research is justified.  
 
A. The Public Benefit Exemption 
 
  The history of the public benefit exemption suggests that it was 
initially understood as a procedural change, rather than an exemption from 
ethical review entirely. Amici curiae in two appellate cases, C.K. v. N.J. 
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1996), and Beno v. 
Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994), argued that the public benefits 
research exemption displaced public benefits research review from IRB 
oversight, but not from oversight altogether. 
 Initially, IRBs reviewed public benefits research just as they 
reviewed other human subjects research, and this practice was upheld in 
Crane v. Matthews, 417 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1976). Crane prompted the 
public benefits exemption, which removed public benefits research from 
IRBs’ jurisdiction. However, the Ninth Circuit in Beno recognized that 
public benefit research exempt from IRB review is still subject to “an 
examination of the proposed project's potential danger to participants' 
physical, mental and emotional well-being” (1070). C.K. agreed, stating that 
“the ‘additional layer of review’ from which HHS exempted public benefits 
experiments was the regulatory requirement of IRB review, not the statutory 
requirement of review for danger” (190). 
 Some have argued for expanding the exemption beyond research on 
the benefit levels of federal programs like Medicare and Medicaid, thus 
exempting a wide swath of research on public benefits. Law professor 
Elmer Abbo argues that quality-improvement research on dialysis should be 
exempt from ethical review (Abbo 2007, 579), as does a Hastings Center 
working group (Lynn 2007, 671). The Secretary's Advisory Committee on 
Human Research Protections (SACHRP) believes “institutions should be 
able to apply the exemption to public programs supported by state agencies” 
as well as to federal programs (SACHRP, 2008). 
 These arguments have been accompanied by some de facto 
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expansion of the exemption. The HHS secretary has exempted randomized 
trials on the quality of care among Medicare beneficiaries (Peikes 2009). 
Research on the allocation rules for transplantable organs (Egan 2006), and 
on HIV epidemiology in at-risk communities (Merion 2005), has also been 
exempted. Most strikingly, research on the prevalence of preterm birth and 
infant death among participants in the Special Supplemental Nutrition 
Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) was held exempt. This 
research involved looking through and analyzing infant death certificates, 
matching the names on the death certificates to the names of children whose 
mothers received WIC prenatally, and comparing the death rates of African-
American infants and white infants whose mothers were on WIC (Khanani 
2010). One can certainly imagine the mothers—had they been asked—
refusing permission to have the death certificates coded in this way and 
matched, as they were, with factors like race and whether the mother 
smoked tobacco during pregnancy. 
  
B. Fair Benefits and Public Benefits 
 
 Some have already endorsed the ethical review of public benefits 
research, though without explicitly invoking concerns about democratic 
deliberation (Harvard Law Review, 1995; Rosenbaum, 1993, 123-26). 
Democratic deliberation, I will argue, further favors the ethical review of 
public benefits research. 
 Existing advocates have focused  the threat that public benefits 
research poses to participants’ medical well-being—that is, the threat that 
research harms participants. This concern seems to fit into the branch of 
research ethics that addresses risk-benefit balancing. There is an additional 
concern, however, that Beno and the federal regulations also seem to 
recognize: the danger that research will use subjects against their will for 
the benefit of others. This fits more clearly into the branches of research 
ethics that address informed consent and respect for participants. 
  In particular, public benefits research potentially stands in tension 
with the Belmont Report’s dictum that research “should not unduly involve 
persons from groups unlikely to be among the beneficiaries of subsequent 
applications of the research”  (National Commission 1978, 10). This “fair 
benefits” requirement is echoed in other statements of clinical research 
ethics, such as CIOMS’s requirement that research be “responsive to the 
health needs and the priorities of the population or community in which it is 
to be carried out” (2002). Public benefits research frequently involves 
taking resources away from poor and disadvantaged beneficiaries to see 
whether these beneficiaries are able to maintain a tolerable standard of 
living after losing benefits. As such, the fair benefits requirement may limit 
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public benefits research on economically disadvantaged subjects, 
particularly when conducted for the benefit of more advantaged individuals 
who want to minimize the tax burden of supporting entitlement programs 
rather than for the benefit of other disadvantaged individuals. 
 Jan Blustein demonstrates this ethical tension in discussing the 
ethics of the National Job Corps Study, a program evaluation that would fall 
under the current public benefits exception (Blustein 2005, 824). The study 
randomized some Job Corps applicants into a control group that did not get 
to participate in Job Corps (a program that offers educational and vocational 
training to young adults between 16 and 24 years of age). The study was 
justified on the basis that “random assignment was necessary because it was 
the only way to provide Congress and the public with credible evidence 
about the success of the program” (Burghardt, 1997). However, participants 
complained about being treated as guinea pigs and about the study serving 
the interests of wealthier individuals, but not their own interests (Blustein 
2005, 834). As Blustein suggests: 
 
Research is prima facie unjust if some groups disproportionately 
bear the burdens and others reap the benefits. Yet over the past 30 
years, evaluations have been conducted almost exclusively on public 
programs that benefit low-income and vulnerable populations. 
Middle-class benefits like Medicare, the home mortgage deduction, 
and the college Work-Study programs have been largely untouched. 
To the extent that participants in social program evaluations assume 
risk or miss out on desired services, this disparity would seem to 
raise questions of justice (2005, 838). 
 
In a context—that of federal and state entitlement programs—where there is 
already a “democracy deficit” and where deliberative involvement with 
current recipients of entitlements is limited, expanding the public benefits 
research exemption risks allowing research that fails to adequately represent 
the interests of participants, and so violates the principle of democratic 
deliberation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 How would incorporating a democratic deliberation principle 
change the ethics of human subjects research? I have argued that it would 
recommend greater inclusion of participants in the review process, and 
would counsel against exempting public benefits research from ethical 
review. This would not give deliberation unlimited scope. Legal 
institutions, for instance, often are initially constructed through intensive 
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deliberation, but later governed by systems of rules that grow out of that 
initial deliberation (Dryzek 2000, 14). Likewise, deliberation might be more 
important in initial review or the drafting of regulations than in day-to-day 
enforcement. 
 Nonetheless, the principle of democratic deliberation supports 
efforts to make the ethical review of research more publicly accessible. The 
PCSBI continued to embrace a principle of democratic deliberation in its 
recent work on human subjects research ethics (2012). The proposals I 
suggest give this principle content. 
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Persad table 1 
 
Participants included Advisory board Jurisdiction 
Benefit recipients Social Security Federal 
Clients (encouraged) Adult day care TN 
Consumers Health care appeals  CT; FL; GA; IA; 
MA; OH 
Consumers (>50%) Consumer Operated and 
Oriented Plans 
Federal 
Consumers (>50%) Health care collaboratives TX 
Consumers (2) Human subjects research NH 
Current or former users (>=50%) In-Home Supportive 
Services  
CA 
Deaf  (>50%) Schools for the deaf KY 
Disabled and advocates  (>50%) Rehabilitation technology Federal 
Hearing aid users Hearing aid fitters’ licensure  RI 
Mentally ill offenders; relatives Mentally Ill Offender Task 
Force 
CO; AZ 
Professional clients Physicians and pharmacists’ 
licensure  
SD 
Recipients; donors; public Cord blood stem cell banks IL 
Representatives of elderly, needy, or 
underprivileged 
County Boards of Health GA 
Sufferers; family Mental illness advocacy Federal 
Sufferers; parents and family Developmental disability  LA 
User advocates Protection and Advocacy 
Service 
IN 
Users (>50%) Community health centers AK 
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